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Pennsylvania's Approach to Claims for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: Neither Logic Nor
Practical Politics1
Seven years after its decision in Sinn v. Burd,2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has answered the question it left for another day.
That question asked whether a parent has a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in instances where the
parent does not contemporaneously observe the injury to the child,
but rather, comes upon the accident and observes the injured
child.3 This issue has attracted much debate within the Pennsylva-
nia courts as well as within other jurisdictions."
This comment traces the cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress from its origination in England to its present
status in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's approach is then compared
to the approaches taken by other jurisdictions. Finally, this com-
ment examines and analyzes the trend toward applying a more
flexible approach and explains why such an application is more al-
igned with modern tort law.
Claim For Nervous Shock In England
The early common law did not recognize a cause of action for
fright negligently inflicted in the absence of contemporaneous bod-
ily injury or physical impact upon the plaintiff. Illustrative of this
view is the case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultos.5
In that case, an action was brought to recover damages for injuries
sustained by the 'plaintiff through the alleged negligence of defend-
ant's servant.' Unaware of an oncoming train, the servant in charge
1. This statement is excerpted from the seminal case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Justice Andrews in his famous dissent in Palsgraf
declared: "What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics."
Id. at 352, 162 N.E. at 103.
2. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See infra note 160-232 and accompanying text.
5. [1888] 13 App. & Cas. 222 (1888).
6. Id. at 225.
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of the railway gate instructed plaintiff to drive over the railway
crossing.7 The plaintiff, who narrowly missed being struck, con-
tended that the experience caused him severe shock which resulted
in physical injuries.' Sir Richard Couch, writing for the Lordships,
announced that "[d]amages arising from mere sudden terror unac-
companied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous
or mental shock, cannot, under such circumstances,. . .be consid-
ered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things, would
flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper."9
This rigid English rule was subsequently abrogated by the Brit-
ish court in the case of Dulieu v. White & Sons.10 In Dulieu, the
plaintiff, who was pregnant, was behind the bar of her husband's
pub when the defendant-servant drove a pair-horse van into the
pub.1 As a consequence, the plaintiff gave premature birth to her
child who was born mentally handicapped.12 Finding the require-
ment of physical impact to be unreasonable, the British Court
promulgated a new theory for recovery for claims of nervous
shock.' 3 The Dulieu court declared that a plaintiff, may recover
damages for nervous shock which arises from a reasonable fear of
immediate physical injury to oneself. 4
Several years later, in Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 5 recovery
for nervous shock was expanded to encompass a parent who feared
for the safety of her child but who neither sustained physical im-
pact nor feared physical injury to herself. In Hambrook, a servant
of the defendant negligently left a motor lorry unattended and un-
secured at the top of a street.'6 As a result, the lorry rushed vio-
lently down the street, passing plaintiff's wife who had only mo-
ments before departed from her children.' 7 Plaintiff's wife became
frightened for the safety of her children who by that time were out
of sight and possibly in the path of the fugitive lorry.' 8 Immedi-




10. [1901] 2 K.B. 669 (1901). See also Bell v. Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 26
L.R. Ir. 428, 442 (1890).




15. [1924] 1 K.B. 141 (1924).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 141-42.
18. Id. at 142.
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matching the description of one of her children, had been injured
by the lorry.1 9 Consequently, plaintiff's wife suffered nervous shock
which resulted in her death."0 The court held that a parent who
suffered mental shock from a reasonable fear of immediate physi-
cal injury to a child may recover for those damages attendant to
the resulting nervous shock.2
However, subsequent British courts were reluctant to extend the
concept of foreseeability to permit bystander recovery. In Bourhill
v. Young,22 a motorcyclist collided with a motorcar while travelling
down a highway.2 3 The plaintiff who was standing on a tramway
platform 45 feet from the accident heard the noise without seeing
the accident and suffered nervous shock resulting in the stillbirth
of her child one month later.24 The British court denied plaintiff's
claim for nervous shock holding that the cyclist owed a duty to
persons which he could reasonably foresee might be injured, and
since plaintiff was not within the zone of danger, the defendant
owed her no duty.2 Lord Porter, distinguishing Hambrook, noted
that in that case, the defendant's negligence was potentially dan-
gerous to everyone on the street including the mother who feared
that the runaway lorry might injure her children.26 In Bourhill,
however, because the plaintiff was not on the road where defend-
ant drove his cycle negligently, she was not a reasonably foresee-
able plaintiff and thus defendant owed her no duty27
Likewise, in King v. Phillips,28 a taxicab driver backed up his
taxi into a boy on his tricycle.2 9 The boy's screams were heard by
his mother who then saw the tricycle being run over but could not
19. Id.
20. Id. at 142-43.
21. Id. at 152. The court reasoned that "the defendant ought to have anticipated that
if his lorry ran away down this narrow street, it might terrify some woman to such an ex-
tent, through fear of some immediate bodily injury to herself, that she would receive such a
mental shock as would injure her health. Can any real distinction be drawn from the point
of view of what the defendant ought to have anticipated and what, therefore, his duty was,
between that case and the case of a woman whose fear is for her child, and not for herself?."
Id. See generally, Note, HARv. L.R. 1033 (1936). The American companion case is Bowman
v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
22. [1943] A.C. 92 (1943).
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. [1953] 1 Q.B. 429 (1953).
29. Id. at 429-30.
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see the child (who had avoided the accident).30 The mother, who
sustained nervous shock, filed suit against the driver's master.31
The British court entered judgment for the defendant.2 Lord Jus-
tice Singleton, affirming the decision of the trial court,33 held that
the driver could not have reasonably anticipated that injury could
have been caused to the mother by backing up his taxi without
looking behind him. 4 Therefore, the Lord Justice concluded, the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff-mother.
3 5
Notwithstanding the narrow interpretation which the Hambrook
decision received, other British courts continued to permit recov-
ery for nervous shock where there was neither sustained physical
impact nor threatened physical harm to the plaintiff. For example,
in Boardman v. Saunderson the English Court of Appeal held a
defendant liable for the nervous shock sustained by a father after
hearing the screams of his son as the defendant drove his automo-
bile over the child's leg. 37 The court held that the father's injuries
were reasonably foreseeable since the defendant knew that the
child was in the yard, that the father was within earshot, and that
carelessness on his part might result in injury both to the child and
to the father who would come to the child's assistance. 38 The de-
fendant, therefore, owed a duty to both the child and the father. 9
The outermost boundaries of the foreseeability approach were
demarcated in Chadwick v. British Railways Board40 where the
court permitted recovery for nervous shock sustained by an indi-
vidual who feared for neither his own safety nor that of his chil-
dren. In Chadwick, the wife, as administratrix, brought an action
for damages for nervous shock sustained by her husband, which
30. Id. at 430.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 437.
33. Id. at 434. Justice McNair, for the court below, followed the decision of the House
of Lords in Bourhill v. Young and held that the defendant owed no duty to the mother.
34. Id. at 435.
35. Id. at 435-46.
36. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (1967).
37. Id. at 1318-19. The defendant and the father and son had gone together to a gas
station to pick up the defendant's car. Id. The defendant asked the father to pay the bill.
Id. While the father went to the office, the child remained in the courtyard. Id. The defend-
ant then began to back his car out of the garage and failing to see the child, ran over the
child's foot. Id. The father heard the child's screams and rushed outside to find his son's
foot trapped under the auto's front wheel. Id.
38. Id. at 1320.
39. Id. at 1322.
40. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912 (1967).
41. Id. at 919-20.
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led to his death, as the result of his efforts in rescuing victims at
the scene of a serious railroad accident which occurred 200 yards
from his home.42 The court found that the defendant railroad had
been negligent toward its passengers and thus could have reasona-
bly foreseen that the passengers would suffer injury."' He found
further that it was also foreseeable that someone might try to res-
cue the passengers and in so doing, suffer injuries. Therefore, the
defendant owed a duty not only to its passengers but also to the
rescuer.
4
The most recent pronouncement by the British courts exploring
the parameters of liability for emotional distress was set forth in
McLoughlin v. O'Brian.5 In McLoughlin, the House of Lords was
confronted with a claim for nervous shock sustained by a mother
who was not present at the scene of the accident involving her hus-
band and children.4' The plaintiff-mother was located at home two
miles from the accident when she learned of its occurrence. 47 Sub-
sequently, she was taken to the hospital where she saw the surviv-
ing members of the family and learned of one child's death.' In
the tradition of the British courts each Lord Justice delivered a
separate opinion. The crux of these opinions, unanimously favoring
the mother's claim, concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable
that a parent would receive nervous shock when learning of inju-
ries inflicted on her family.' 9 Lord Wilberforce expressed the view
that "[tihere can be no doubt that these circumstances, witnessed
by the [plaintiff], were distressing in the extreme and were capable
of producing an effect going well beyond grief and sorrow." 50 Lord
Wilberforce reasoned that to require direct or immediate sight or
hearing would be impractical and unjust and that one who comes
42. Id. at 914-15.
43. Id. at 921.
44. Id.
45. 2 All. E.R. 298 (H.R.) (1982).
46. Id. at 298.
47. Id. The trial judge held for the defendant finding that the defendant owed no duty
of care to the plaintiff because it was not reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer ner-
vous shock. Id. The trial court's holding was upheld on appeal but on different grounds. Id.
Lord Justice Stephenson found that the injury was reasonably foreseeable and the defend-
ant owed a duty of care but that recovery was precluded due to policy considerations. Id.
Lord Justice Griffiths held that the injury was foreseeable but that the defendant owed a
duty of care only to persons near the scene of the accident Id. Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce
concurred with both opinions. Id. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the House of Lords.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 301.
50. Id. at 304.
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upon the scene from close proximity should not be precluded from
recovery. 1
Development Of The Cause Of Action In Pennsylvania
The evolution of a cause of action for emotional distress closely
parallels that of England. The recognition of such a claim had its
genesis in the case of Ewing v. Pittsburgh Railway Company,52
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied recovery for mental
suffering absent bodily injury.53 The rule enunciated in Ewing,
later characterized as the impact rule,54 precluded recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the distress was ac-
companied by physical impact upon the plaintiff.
55
During the reign of the impact rule, Pennsylvania courts, as well
as courts of other jurisdictions, recognized the harshness and un-
fairness that resulted from the application of this rule.56 Conse-
51. Id.
52. 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892). In Ewing, the plaintiff alleged that a train collision
caused the defendant's railroad cars to derail and be thrown against the plaintiff's house. Id.
at 340. The plaintiff claimed that the life threatening incident subjected him to great fright,
nervous excitement and distress. Id.
53. Id. at 44, 23 A. at 340-41. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, quoting MAYNE ON
DAMAGES at 74, stated that "the force of the rule is that the mental suffering.., that grows
out of the sense of peril or the mental agony at the time of the happening of the accident,
and that which is incident to and blended with the bodily pain incident to the injury, and
that apprehension and anxiety thereby induced. In no case has it ever been held that mental
anguish alone, unaccompanied by an injury to the person, afforded a ground of action." 147
Pa. at 44-45, 23 A. at 341.
54. The additional words "a physical impact" first appeared in Potere v. City of Phila-
delphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955).
55. For a discussion of the development of the "impact rule" in Pennsylvania, see
Note, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 229 (1966).
56. Legal scholars who have considered the rule denying recovery in the absence of
contemporaneous physical injury or impact are unanimous in condemning it as unjust and
contrary to experience. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case For
An Independent Tort, 59 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1237 (1971); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 328-332
(4th ed. 1971) 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 18.4 at 1031-1039, (1956); McNiece,
Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1949); Smith, Rela-
tion of Emotions to Injury and Disease, Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli 30 VA. L. REV.
193 (1944); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neurosis in Court 30 VA. L. REV. 87 (1943); Ma-
gruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1033
(1936); 1936 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 375; Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV.
(1933); HALLEN, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L.
REV. 253 (1933); Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock 11 CORNELL L.Q. 512
(1926); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH L. REV. 497 (1922);
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260; Burdick, Tort Liability for
Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock, 5 COLUM L. REV. 179 (1905); and Bohlen, Right to
Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 141
(1902).
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quently, in an attempt to relax the rule, but yet remain within the
ambit of the rule, courts frequently distorted its construction to
enable persons genuinely injured to recover. For example, in
Potere v. City of Philadelphia,57 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
permitted recovery for emotional distress sustained by a truck
driver who suffered only minor physical injuries when the street
collapsed."' Thus, in Potere, the impact rule was extended to per-
mit a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress where the plaintiff incurred any physical impact, no matter
how slight or trivial,59 and notwithstanding any lack of causal con-
nection between the physical impact and the fright induced
injuries.6 0
Because of the inequity of the impact rule, the Pennsylvania ju-
diciary clamored for a more flexible standard for pleading a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress."1 This movement was
trumpeted by Justice Musmanno's dissenting opinion in Bosely v.
Andrews. 2 In denying recovery for damages resulting from fright
and shock upon being chased by defendant's trespassing bull, the
Bosley court held that no recovery could be had for injuries result-
ing from nervous shock or fright or emotional distress absent a
physical injury or physical impact.6 3 In dissent, emphasizing that a
grievous injury may be sustained by a trespassing force which in no
way physically touched the plaintiff," Justice Musmanno con-
57. 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955).
58. Id. at 584, 112 A.2d at 102. Other jurisdictions have also been guilty of distorting
the rule's import. See, e.g., Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y.S.
914 (1897). In Jones, the New York Supreme Court held that a sufficient impact had oc-
curred when a small light bulb fell from the ceiling of an automobile onto plaintiff's lap. The
plaintiff was permitted to recover for emotional distress occurring as the result of a miscar-
riage. Id.
59. Id. at 584, 112 A.2d at 102. The Potere court declared that "where. . . a plaintiff
sustains bodily injuries, even though trivial or minor in character, which are accompanied by
fright or mental suffering directly traceable to'the peril in which the defendant's negligence
placed the plaintiff, then mental suffering is a legitimate element of damages." Id.
60. See also supra note 55.
61. See generally Note, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1932). See also Note, "One Step Beyond
the Zone of Danger Limitation Upon the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress," 34 TEMP.
L. Q. 59 (1969).
62. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958). The majority opinion in Bosley made clear that
the impact rule was to be given strict obedience.
63. Id. at 162-63, 142 A.2d at 264. Writing for the majority, Justice Bell noted that "to
allow recovery for fright, fear, nervous shock, humiliation, mental or emotional dis-
tress-with all the disturbances and illnesses which accompany or result therefrom-where
there has been no physical injury or impact, would open Pandora's box." Id. at 162-63, 142
A.2d at 266.
64. Id. at 187, 142 A.2d at 275-76. Examples provided by Justice Musmanno were a
Duquesne Law Review
cluded that the absence of any physical impact should not pre-
clude legal redress." He further declared that obedience to such a
doctrine which would "crumble at the slightest touch of instinctive
reason and natural justice," deprived the law of its dignity.66
In response to the attacks on the validity of the impact rule, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered the wisdom of the rule
in the case of Neiderman v. Brodsky6 7 and abandoned the require-
ment of actual impact as a prerequisite to recovery for emotional
distress.6 8 In Neiderman, a parent brought an action to recover
damages for fright and mental shock which he sustained when his
son, who was standing next to him on the sidewalk, was struck by
the defendant's negligently driven automobile. 69 Writing for the
majority, Justice Roberts promulgated what has come to be known
as the "zone of danger" theory, and held that a plaintiff in danger
of personal injury because of the direction of a negligent force, may
recover for mental pain, shock and physical injuries attendant to
the incident, despite the absence of physical impact. 0
A short time after its inception, the "zone of danger" rule be-
came threatened by the views of other jurisdictions which permit-
ted emotional distress recovery for a bystander-relative who, al-
though not satisfying the "zone of danger" test, sustained
emotional distress and consequent physical injury from witnessing
blinding light or a deafening noise. Id.
65. The hallmark of Musmanno's dissent was his declaration that "I shall continue to
dissent . . . until the cows come home." Id. at 195, 142 A.2d at 280.
66. Id. Justice Musmanno asserted that continued adherence to the impact rule would
be in "violation of the living spirit of the law." Id. at 183, 142 A.2d 274.
67. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). In Neiderman, Justice Roberts responded to Jus-
tice Musmanno's dissent in Bosley and brought the cows home. Id. at 403, 261 A.2d at 85. In
Neiderman, plaintiff brought an action for damages which were contributable to the fright
and mental shock which the plaintiff sustained when the defendant negligently drove an
automobile which skidded onto the sidewalk and struck the plaintiff's son. Id. at 402, 261
A.2d at 84.
68. The first American case to repudiate the requirement of impact for a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress was Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
See also Purcell v. St. Paul R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). In this area of law,
Pennsylvania was "[cilattering close to the caboose instead of cheerfully gliding over the
rails immediately behind the locomotive." Kraub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 256, 273, 220 A.2d 646,
648 (1966). See also Comment, Injuries from Fright Without Contact, 15 CLEv. MAR. L.
REv. 331 (1966).
69. 436 Pa. at 402, 261 A.2d at 84.
70. Id. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90. Chief Justice Bell filed a dissenting opinion. In his view,
the majority's overruling of the impact rule opened a Pandora's box out of which will ema-
nate fictitious and exaggerated claims. Id. at 414, 261 A.2d at 90. Bell noted that a medical,
as well as judicial, "guessing game" was substituted for a well-established rule. Id.
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harm inflicted upon a close relative.7 1 Two early cases to reach the
Pennsylvania Superior Court under this expanded theory were
Scarf v. Koltoffl 2 and Bowman v. Sears Roebuck & Company.73 In
Scarf, a husband was struck and injured by a negligent motorist.
74
His wife, who was not within the "zone of danger," witnessed the
accident and suffered shock which led to a heart attack.7 The su-
perior court held that claimants, who are neither in personal dan-
ger of physical impact, nor fear physical impact, have no legal re-
dress for their injuries.7 Shortly after its decision in Scarf, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed a similar issue in Bowman,
wherein a mother sought damages for emotional distress from ob-
serving the forcible removal of her daughters from a shopping area
by five store employees." That court, adhering to the "zone of
danger" test, permitted recovery, noting that the mother's injuries
resulted not only from the detention of her daughters, but also
from her own physical fear of physical attack by the same store
employees.78
The Pennsylvania courts' fear of advancing new theories of lia-
bility in this area was influenced by several policy concerns relat-
ing to the difficulty in assessing psychic injuries. As recognized in
the landmark case of Sinn v. Burd," in which the "zone of danger"
rule was expanded to allow recovery for plaintiffs outside the "zone
of danger," the particular concerns of the courts for extending lia-
bility had been the difficulty which medical science had in proving
causation between the claimed damages and the alleged fright; the
fear of fabricated or exaggerated claims; the potential for an ava-
lanche of litigation; and unlimited or unduly burdensome liabil-
ity.80 In Sinn, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized that these concerns had been rendered archaic by advances
in medical science.8"
71. See infra notes 85, 190 and 198 and accompanying text.
72. 242 Pa. Super. 294, 363 A.2d 1276 (1976).
73. 245 Pa. Super. 530, 369 A.2d 754 (1976).
74. 242 Pa. Super. at 295, 363 A.2d at 1277.
75. Id. at 295-96, 363 A.2d at 1277.
76. Id. at 297, 363 A.2d at 1280.
77. 245 Pa. Super. at 532, 369 A.2d at 755.
78. Id. at 533, 369 A.2d at 757.
79. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
80. Id.
81. Id. The claim that medical science is incapable of determining whether psychic
damage sustained by the plaintiff and the shock of witnessing the accident are casually
linked has been eradicated. See generally Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAMILY L. 163 (1977). See also Cantor,
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In Sinn, a mother who was outside the "zone of danger" brought
an action for emotional distress which she sustained as a result of
viewing her child being struck and killed by an automobile.82 In
rejecting the proximity limitations of the "zone of danger" test the
court applied traditional principles of negligence. Justice Nix, writ-
ing for the plurality,83 held as a matter of law that it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that a parent who witnessed the injury or death of
a child would suffer emotional distress.8 4 The Sinn court relied
principally on the California Supreme Court decision in Dillon v.
Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 7 CLEV. MAR. L. REv. 428
(1957). See also Ainsworth, Attachment Retrospect and Prospect in Place of Attachment
in Human Behavior (C. Parks & Stevenson-Hinde eds. 1982).
82. 486 Pa. at 146, 404 A.2d at 678 (1979). Although Sinn v. Burd expanded the "zone
of danger rule" in Pennsylvania, this rule is still currently followed by several jurisdictions.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text. See generally Winter, A Tort in Transition:
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A.J. 62 (1984). The facts of Sinn were that
the deceased and her sister were standing alongside the road at the Sinn's mailbox, at which
time defendant, operating his automobile, struck the deceased. Id. at 150-51, 404 A.2d at
674-75. Deceased's sister, however, was not struck but was narrowly missed. Plaintiff ob-
served the incident while positioned at the front door of her home. Id. Plaintiff sought re-
covery for damages she incurred as a result of the emotional distress of witnessing her
daughter's death. Id.
83. The case was heard by Chief Justice Eagen and Justices O'Brien, Roberts, Nix,
Manderino and Larsen. Justice Nix authored the opinion. Chief Justice Eagen specially con-
curred and also filed an opinion. Justice Larsen concurred in the result but did not write an
opinion. Justice Roberts dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice O'Brien joined.
Votes of justices concurring in the result represent only an agreement with the mandate.
Commonwealth v. Glover, 497 Pa. 433, 441 A.2d 1216 (1982). "Under Pennsylvania law, an
opinion joined by fewer than a majority of justices on the Commonwealth's Supreme Court
is not binding or controlling precedent." Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir.
1982); accord, Mt Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 368 A.2d 648 (1977).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that such an opinion is treated "as an
expression of the views of a minority of the court." Vargus at 74, quoting Greiner v. Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 1976); accord, McGowan v. Univer-
sity of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1985).
84. 486 Pa. at 148, 505 A.2d at 679; Chief Justice Eagen, in his concurring opinion,
acknowledged the difficulty of circumscribing the outer limits of liability and concluded that
recovery should be permitted to a plaintiff if: (1) the plaintiff is closely related to the in-
jured party, such as a mother, father, husband or wife; (2) the plaintiff is near the accident
scene and observed it; (3) the plaintiff suffers serious mental distress resulting from witness-
ing the accident and physical injury or suffers serious mental distress and there is a severe
physical manifestation of this mental distress. Note that Chief Justice Eagen would require
the negligenly inflicted emotional distress to be physically manifested, a point on which
Dillon and the Sinn plurality agree. Justice Roberts, writing in dissent, emphatically re-
jected Justice Nix's foreseeability test adopted from Dillon, quoting Justice Spaeth's nota-
tion in Scarf v. Koltoff, 242 Pa. Super. 294, 363 A.2d 1276 (1976), which provided that
"[tihe criteria suggested by Prosser and adopted by Dillon are not reasoned but arbitrary,
for they are unsupported on any policy capable of uniform application." 486 Pa. at 184, 404
A.2d at 692. See generally Justice Roberts' dissent in Sinn for a lengthy criticism on the
ramification of that court's decision.
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Legg.s Specifically, Sinn adopted the three foreseeability factors
enunciated in Dillon for determining whether the infliction of emo-
tional distress was reasonably foreseeable.8 6 The factors set forth
were:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it;
(2) Whether the shock resulted from direct emotional impact upon the
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence;
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship."7
The Sinn court, however, did not consider the right of recovery of
a parent who does not observe the actual accident, but rather,
learns of the child's injury thereafter.8
Since the Sinn decision, subsequent Pennsylvania courts have
narrowly interpreted the contemporaneous observation factor. For
example, in Hoffner v. Hodge," the commonwealth court held that
the lack of personal observation of an accident precluded recovery
for emotional distress.90 Similarly, lack of contemporaneous obser-
vation of the accident was determinative in denying recovery in
Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hospital.9 In Vattimo, the common-
wealth court held that a parent who is informed by telephone of an
accident involving a child, had no cause of action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.9 2
85. 486 Pa. at 152, 404 A.2d at 681, citing Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d
912 '(1968). See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. Id., quoting Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920.
88. 486 Pa. at 173 n.21, 404 A.2d at 686 n.21. The Sinn court also chose not to con-
sider the case where the relationship between plaintiff-bystander and the accident victim
was more remote. Id.
Since the pronouncement of foreseeability factors in Dillon, there have been numerous
articles, cases and comments evaluating its logic and fairness. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 54 at 334-35 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The
Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1236, 1246 (1971). See also 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 214
(1981), for a discussion of the aftermath of Dillon a decade after its decision. See generally
Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between Cali-
fornia and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1976).
89. 47 Pa. Commw. 277, 407 A.2d 940 (1979).
90. Id. at 279, 407 A.2d at 942.
91. 59 Pa. Commw. 1, 428 A.2d 765 (1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 402 Pa. 241,
465 A.2d 1231 (1983) (claim for recovery not at issue in the appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court).
92. Id. at 6, 428 A.2d at 768. Vattimo presented the commonwealth court with a situa-
tion where plaintiffs son, a hospitalized paranoid-schizophrenic, set a fire while negligently
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The contemporaneous observation requirement enunciated in
Sinn was subsequently interpreted in Bliss v. Allentown Public Li-
brary. 3 In Bliss, the court rejected defendant's motion to dismiss
even though the plaintiff did not visually observe the accident to
her daughter but rather heard the accident and immediately there-
after viewed the scene.94 The court explained that in order to with-
stand a motion to dismiss, direct visual observation of the accident
need not be pleaded." In noting that the plaintiff had observed the
victim immediately prior to the accident and while in the immedi-
ate vicinity heard the crashing sound of the accident, the court
stated that the plaintiff sufficiently identified herself as a
"percipient witness" to state a cause of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress within the meaning of Sinn v. Burd.9 8
"To deny a claim because one's eyes do not view the accident at
the precise moment of its occurrence ignores the reality that the
sum total of the incident produced the emotional injury for which
appellant seeks redress. '9 7 The court concluded that a plaintiff
who had some form of experiential perception of the accident, did
not need visual observation."
Two years after its decision in Sinn, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had its first opportunity to address the issue of whether the
parent must plead contemporaneous sensory observation of the ac-
cident in order to make out a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. In Yandrich v. Radic,e9 the equally divided 0 Penn-
left unsupervised. Id. at 3, 428 A.2d at 767. The plaintiff sought relief for emotional distress
incurred when she was informed by telephone of the event. Id. at 3-4, 428 A.2d at 767.
93. 497 F. Supp. 487 (1980).
94. Id. at 488.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 489.
98. Id.
99. 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981).
100. Id. In Yandrich, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was equally divided and as a
result the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. 286 Pa. Super. 625, 427 A.2d 247
(1980) (Memorandum). The superior court had affirmed the reluctant decision of Judge
Dowling of the trial court. The trial court opinion was filed on April 24, 1979, before the
supreme court's decision in Sinn which was dated July 11, 1979. Therefore, the trial judge
was bound by the zone of danger edict. The court's opinion demonstrated its reluctance to
follow precedent, noting that:
[T]he scope of duty in tort is often defined in terms of reasonable foreseeability of
the harm to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's negligence .... Each of
these characterizations are mere terms used to define the court's limit on recovery.
Certainly one can foresee that the killing of an individual will cause emotional trauma
to others. The emotional trauma can be just as real, just as devastating, whether one
comes upon the scene and sees the individual on the ground, or whether one sees the
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sylvania Supreme Court refused to extend the right of a parent to
maintain a claim for emotional distress where the parent was
neither a witness to the accident, nor in the immediate vicinity of
the accident. 101 Writing in support of affirmance,' 02 Justice Wilkin-
son articulated that the court was "unwilling to abandon the 'zone
of danger' in toto and enter a realm of uncertainty with no worka-
ble guidelines for recovery."103
In his concurring opinion, Justice Nix capsulized what he ob-
served to be the common thread running through the three stages
of evolution of the cause of action in Pennsylvania. He observed
that in each stage the negligence of the tortfeasor resulted in a
"sensory experience" which, in turn, solicited the mental
distress. 04
Justice Flaherty, writing in support of reversal, urged the aban-
donment of the contemporaneous observation requirement. ' °0 Jus-
tice Flaherty stated that recovery should be permitted where the
emotional distress was experienced by a family member who did
not witness the injury, but suffered emotional trauma because of
it. 0 Utilizing the concept of foreseeability, the opinion in support
of reversal emphasized that "whether one was a bystander or
whether one came upon the scene and observed the individual on
the ground, or whether one saw the individual in the hospital, or in
a morgue, or never saw them, none of these situations was any
more or less foreseeable than the others.'1
0 7
individual in the hospital or in a morgue or never sees them; none of these situations
is any more or less foreseeable than the other.
101 Dauph. C. Rpt. 72, 78 (1979).
The opinions in a case decided by an equally divided court do not carry the weight of
precedent. Community Med. Services v. Local 2665, 292 Pa. Super. 238, 243 n.3 437 A.2d 23,
26 n.3 (1981); see also Commonwealth v. Grimm, 63 Lanc. Rev. 577 (1973).
101. 495 Pa. at 245, 433 A.2d at 459-60.
102. Justice Wilkinson was joined by Justice Roberts. Justice Nix filed an opinion in
support of affirmance.
103. Id. at 247, 433 A.2d at 410-61.
104. Id. at 251, 433 A.2d at 463. Justice Nix also stated, as he previously noted in
Sinn, that damages were not to be extended to compensate for the grief for solatium ema-
nating from the resulting loss, but rather for injuries resulting from the traumatic impact of
the situation that the person witnessed, Id. at 250, 433 A.2d at 462-63.
105. Id. at 256, 433 A.2d at 465. Justice Flaherty was joined by Justices Larsen and
Kauffman.
106. Id. at 255, 433 A.2d at 465.
107. Id. at 254, 433 A.2d at 464. Recent cases have directed the Pennsylvania judici-
ary's attention away from the sensory experience of the plaintiff and have focused upon the
event or accident.
In Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the court found
that legal redress was not available to a wife for negligent infliction of emotional distress
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Yandrich left the non-witness issue unresolved. In an attempt to
clarify this issue the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted alloca-
tur in the recent cases of Mazzagatti v. Everingham'0 8 and Brooks
v. Decker.10 9
Mazzagatti v. Everingham And Brooks v. Decker
In Mazzagatti, the plaintiff's daughter, while riding her bicycle,
was struck and fatally injured by an automobile driven by defend-
ant.110 At the time of the accident the plaintiff was at work approx-
imately one mile from the accident scene."' She was immediately
informed of the accident and arrived shortly thereafter." 2 Upon
arrival she observed her injured daughter."'
Plaintiff brought an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress against the defendant driver." 4 In her complaint she al-
leged that as a result of her observation of her daughter's plight
she suffered shock and sustained grievous mental pain which re-
sulted in acute depression and nervous condition." 5
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment stating that under the parameters enunciated in Sinn v.
Burd, a plaintiff who did not experience and contemporaneously
resulting from witnessing her husband's development of asbestosis. Id. The court reasoned
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sinn "contemplated a discrete and identifiable
traumatic event to trigger recovery." Id. at 1032. Since the emotional injury was not in-
flicted by a "sudden and violent" accident, the court found that the plaintiffs claim was
insufficient to state a cause of action under Pennsylvania law. Id.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court decided Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Installation, 324 Pa.
Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984), in harmony with the holding in Arnader. In Cathcart, the
court concluded that "[tihe developing case law clearly indicated that a cause of action
would not lie for emotional distress negligently caused to a bystander, unless the bystander
personally observed an identifiable traumatic accident." Id. at 150, 471 A.2d at 507. See also
Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp., 334 Pa. Super. 36, 482 A.2d 1067 (1984).
108. Due to the unavailability of the Mazzagatti opinion in the Pennsylvania State
Reports, citations to that reporter have been omitted. 516 A.2d 672 (1986).
109. 516 A.2d 1380 (1986).
110. 516 A.2d at 673. At the time of the accident, the victim was riding her bicycle in a
residential area near her home in Whitpain Township. Id.
111. Id. at 673-74.
112. Id. at 674.
113. Id. at 674. Plaintiff was informed by telephone that her daughter had been in-
volved in an automobile accident. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Plaintiff filed a three count complaint in trespass against the defendant. Id.
Only the second count is the subject of the appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id.
The first count sets forth a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by the victim's
sister who actually witnessed the accident. Id. at 674 n.1. The third count alleged that as a
result of the injuries sustained by plaintiff-victim's mother, her husband had been deprived
of her society and services. Id.
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observe a tortious injury to a close relative did not state a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 16 On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order.
1 7
In an attempt to clarify its position on the elements required to
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur. a
Brooks v. Decker involved a father who, although he did not wit-
ness the accident, came upon the scene only moments thereafter.
The father, while en route to meet his son, pulled off the road to
yield to an oncoming ambulance.1 9 He subsequently followed the
ambulance to the scene of the accident.12 0 As he exited from his
automobile he observed his son's bicycle lying on the ground. 21
Upon further inspection, the father discovered that it had been his
son that had been struck by defendant's automobile.
1 22
The father commenced an action against the owner and operator
of the automobile, seeking damages for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. " The trial court sustained defendant's preliminary
objections and dismissed the father's case because the father had
not observed the actual occurrence of the accident. 2 " On appeal,
116. Id. Plaintiff additionally averred that she was tortured by flashbacks and night-
mares of her injured daughter and suffered from a general inability to sleep. Id. She finally
alleged that her acute nervous condition and mental disturbance prevented her from per-
forming her duties of employment. Id.
117. Id. at 674-75. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the plaintiff urged
the court to follow the Massachusetts case of Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (1978), which permitted recovery to a plaintiff-parent who arrived at the scene
of the accident and witnessed the injured child. Id. at 675. See supra notes 190-194 and
accompanying text. The superior court was unpersuaded by Dziokonski since the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court was cognizant of that decision when it decided Sinn v. Burd. Id.
118. 508 Pa. 350, 497 A.2d 609. On appeal, the plaintiff urged that the grant of defend-
ant's demurrer was improper in light of the flexible reasonable foreseeability test that the
plaintiff alleged was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sinn v. Burd. 516 A.2d
at 675. Plaintiff explained that the resulting emotional distress derived from her observation
of the accident scene only moments after the accident took place was reasonably foreseeable
and neither remote nor unexpected. Id. at 676.
119. Due to the unavailability of the Brooks opinion in the Pennsylvania State Re-




123. Id. Two other counts were enumerated in the plaintiff's complaint. The first
count stated the minor's claim for personal injuries. Id. at 1381 n.1. The second count stated
a claim for the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Id. Both were settled and thus
not the subject of the appeaL Id.
124. Id. at 1382. The Honorable Judge David E. Grine of the Court of Common Pleas
of Centre County sustained the objections, relying on the precedent set in Yandrich v.
Radic. The trial court indicated that while it was constrained by precedent, "this Court fails
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the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order. 125
to see the difference in the emotional trauma suffered by one coming upon the scene of an
accident and observing a loved one shortly after impact and that individual witnessing the
impact suffered by a loved one." Id.
The trial court also sustained the preliminary objections on the grounds that the plain-
tiff's action was barred by § 301 of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act
of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(5) (repealed). Id. at 1381 n.2.
At the time this claim arose, section 301 provided that: "Tort liability is abolished with
respect to any injury that takes place in this state in accordance with the provisions of this
Act if such injury arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" with certain
specified exceptions. These exceptions include, inter alia, damages for non-economic loss if
the accident results in death, expenses for reasonable and necessary medical services in ex-
cess of $750.00, cosmetic disfigurement which is permanent and irreparable, and physical or
mental impairment which prevents the victim from engaging in his usual activities for more
than sixty consecutive days. See 40 P.S. § 1009.301 (a)(5). With regard to Count III brought
by appellant in this case on his own behalf, appellant's complaint failed to allege that he
met any of the "thresholds" which would permit a suit for such damages. See R. at 7a-8a.
Further, plaintiff acknowledges that he "did not plead any injuries specified in the Act." 516
A.2d at 1381-82 n.2.
125. 495 A.2d 575 (1985). On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the case was
heard before Judges Wickersham, Wieand and Del Sole. The majority's opinion was au-
thored by Judge Wieand in which Judge Wickersham concurred. Judge Del Sole filed a
dissenting opinion.
Writing for the majority, Judge Wieand noted that the decision of the trial court was in
conformity with the present state of law in Pennsylvania. 495 A.2d at at 576. Judge Wieand,
relying on Sinn v. Burd and Yandrich v. Radic held that a parent-bystander who had not
witnessed the accident did not have a legally recognized cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. Judge Wieand concluded that if such a cause of action is
to be recognized in Pennsylvania it would be the province of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to so promulgate. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Del Sole asserted that the Pennsylvania judiciary should
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress whether or not the
plaintiff actually witnesses the accident, or comes upon the scene shortly thereafter. Id.
In his analysis, Judge Del Sole first examined the Sinn decision in which the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that the emotional distress suffered by the
parent-bystander in viewing an accident was a foreseeable injury and thereafter recognized a
cause of action for the parent-bystander. Id.. Judge Del Sole further observed that the Sinn
court specifically reserved opinion on the question of whether a parent who had not wit-
nessed an injury to his or her child but had received subsequent notification of the incident
may recover from the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id..
Judge Del Sole next discussed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Yandrich v.
Radic, 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981), wherein the court addressed the issue left un-
resolved in Sinn. 495 A.2d at 578. In Yandrich an evenly divided court held that a parent
who had not been in close proximity to the accident nor witnessed the harm caused to his
child, but received subsequent notification shortly thereafter, could not maintain a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 495 Pa. at 247, 433 A.2d at 461. Thus,
Judge Del Sole observed that the issue which is without judicial cognizance is whether the
absence of one of the foreseeability factors, more specifically, the contemporaneous sensory
observation factor, would sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 495 A.2d at 578. In support of his opinion Judge Del Sole enumerated several jurisdic-
tions including New Hampshire (Corso v. Merril, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979)), Texas
(Landreth v. Reed, 507 S.W. 2d 286 (1978)), Massachusetts (Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1975); Ferroter v. Daniel O'Connel's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereafter granted allocatur. 126
In discussing these cases, only the opinions in the Mazzagatti deci-
sion will be referred to since the justices of the Brooks court
adopted their respective opinions in that case.
Writing for the majority in Mazzagatti, Chief Justice Nix dis-
cussed why an expansion of the Sinn foreseeability test, to encom-
pass a plaintiff-relative who did not experience or contemporane-
ously observe the accident, would violate basic principles of tort
law. 2 ' Couching his analysis in terms of duty and proximate cause,
Justice Nix recited that a defendant's breach of duty must proxi-
mately cause the plaintiff's injury.12 Initially bypassing the deter-
mination of duty, Justice Nix embarked on a discussion of proxi-
mate cause. He explained that a "determination of a duty of care
entails an analysis of its integral component, proximate cause.""2 9
Simply stated, the Chief Justice took the position that proxi-
mate cause was a term of art which merely reflected a "policy judg-
ment as to the appropriate extent of liability."1 ' Therefore, the
(1980); Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. 365, 446 N.E.2d 78 (1983)), and California (Archi-
bald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App.2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1963)), which have recognized a
cause of action where a parent did not observe the accident injuring a child but arrived
upon the scene shortly thereafter. 495 A.2d at 578-79.
In conclusion, Judge Del Sole reasoned that the claim was improvidently dismissed be-
cause the emotional trauma suffered by the plaintiff was the same as if he had witnessed the
accident. Id. at 579. Furthermore, plaintiff's injuries were reasonably foreseeable in light of
the negligence of the defendant. Id. To permit the case to proceed to trial, in Del Sole's
view, would be a natural extension of the principles established in Sinn. Id.
126. 508 Pa. 622, 500 A.2d 417 (1985).
127. 516 A.2d at 675.
128. Id. at 676.
129. Id. at 678-79. Justice Nix defined the role of proximate cause or legal cause.
Those concepts, he stated, were "applied by the courts to those more or less undefined
considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation can be demonstrated."
Id., citing W.P. KEETON, Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) at 273. Justice Nix also
quoted Neiderman, reflecting that "[tihe best statement of the rule was that a wrong-doer
was responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his misconduct." 516 A.2d at
676.
130. Id. at 677 n.4. Justice Nix also found that the terms "duty" and "foreseeability"
were terms of art reflecting policy judgments. Id.
Quoting Prosser and Keeton, the Chief Justice illustrated that the determination of pub-
lic policy was one "fraught with circumlocution" by stating:
It is quite possible to state every question which arises in connection with "proximate
cause" in the form of a single question: was the defendant under a duty to protect the
plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur? Such a form of statement does
not, of course, provide any answer to the question, or solve anything whatsoever; but
it may be helpful since "duty"-also a legal conclusion-is perhaps less likely than
"proximate cause" to be interpreted as if it were a policy-free factfinding. Thus,
"duty" may serve to direct attention to the policy issues which determine the extent
of the original obligation and of its continuance, rather than to the mechanical se-
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court based the resolution of this issue on the determination of the
policy in Pennsylvania.131 That policy is one which seeks to limit
unduly burdensome liability.13 2 Revisiting Sinn, Justice Nix ex-
plained that this public policy or its legal term, proximate cause,
found expression in the first two foreseeability factors, that is,
whether the plaintiff was located near the accident scene as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it; and secondly,
whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
the plaintiff from the contemporaneous sensory observation of the
accident, as contrasted with one who learned of the accident from
others after its occurrence.1 33 The court then set forth its rationale
for requiring these two factors by stating:
quence of events which goes to make up causation in fact. The question whether
there is a duty has most often seemed helpful in cases where the only issue is in
reality whether the defendant stands in any such relation to the plaintiff as to create
any legally recognized obligation of conduct for the plaintiff's benefit. Or, reverting
again to the starting point, whether the interests of the plaintiff are entitled to legal
protection at the defendant's hands against the invasion which has in fact occurred.
Or, again reverting, whether the conduct is the "proximate cause" of the result. The
circumlocution is unavoidable, since all of these questions are, in reality, one and the
same.
Id. at 676-77, quoting W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5TH ED. 1984) AT 274.
131. 516 A.2d at 676. The Chief Justice, looking to other jurisdictions, found that only
three jurisdictions had permitted recovery where the plaintiff appeared at the accident
scene immediately after its occurrence and suffered emotional distress from witnessing the
victim's injuries. Id., citing: Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.W.2d 1295 (1978); Corso v. Merill, 119
N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979). But see infra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.
132. 416 A.2d at 679 n.9. Justice Nix cited Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d
1085, wherein he explained:
Regretably, the concept of a "deep pocket" has become pervasive in this area and has
frequently influenced decisions as to when a cause of action should arise and as to the
appropriate recovery to allow for the claimed loss. The "deep pocket" theory springs
from the "desire to insure that victims of tortious injury can reach a defendant with
sufficient wealth to provide adequate compensation." This motive has had a tendency
to obscure the basis of the finding of liability and the extent to which reimbursement
can be justified. . . . This motive has had a tendency to obscure the basis of the
finding of liability and the extent to which reimbursement can be justified. Moreover,
another basic fallacy with the thinking of those who propose unlimited expansion of
tort recovery is the failure to recognize that it is the consumer public that ultimately
must bear the loss for the inflationary spiral that follows in its wake. More frequent
judgments with escalating awards creates a situation that all policy holders, and not
the insurance companies, ultimately must meet. The rising costs, generated by in-
creasing numbers of law suits and higher judgments, are tolerable provided that the
occasion for the injury justifies the action and the recovery reflects the actual loss. If
either is out of kilter an undue burden is unfairly passed on to the innocent citizen
policy holders.
Id. at 230, 501 A.2d at 1101 (citations omitted).
133. 416 A.2d at 679.
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[W]here a close relative is not present at the scene of the accident, but in-
stead learns of the accident from a third party, the close relative's prior
knowledge of the injury to the victim serves as a buffer against the full im-
pact of observing the accident scene. By contrast, the relative who contem-
poraneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to
brace his or her emotional system.""
As a result, Justice Nix concluded that Pennsylvania adheres to
the view that a driver owes a duty of care to those persons within
the zone of danger and to those persons who contemporaneously
witness an injury to a close relative because it is only in those situ-
ations where the driver's conduct could be said to be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury." 5
Justice Flaherty joined the Chief Justice in affirmance of the
lower court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.1" 6 Justice Flaherty's concurrence was a complete reversal of
his dissenting opinion in Yandrich v. Radic."17 The reason set forth
by Justice Flaherty for vacillating was his concern for tort reform
and the plight of the insurance industry.'38
134. Id.
135. Id. The court further stated:
The negligent tortfeasor inflicts upon this bystander an injury separate and apart
from the injury to the victim .... Hence, the critical element for establishing such
liability is the contemporaneous observance of the injury to the close relative. Where,
as here, the plaintiff has no contemporaneous sensory perception of the injury, the
emotional distress results more from the particular emotional makeup of the plaintiff
rather than from the nature of defendant's actions.
Id. (citation omitted).
The court continued:
In reality this is a claim for affectional loss or solatium to recompense a surviving
relative for her feelings of anguish, bereavement and grief caused by the fact of the
injury to and death of the decedent. In Sinn we noted that the common law has
traditionally denied a damage award for solatium .... The feelings of anguish and
bereavement suffered by Mazzagatti are not substantially different from those suf-
fered by any parent who sees his or her dying injured child, whether it be at the scene
of the accident or in the hospital room afterwards.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 680.
137. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 680. In support of this view, Justice Flaherty stated:
This body, the Supreme Court of the fourth largest state of the United States, must
take a leading role in re-evaluating the social utility of an ever expanding and in-
creasingly imaginative tort system. It is illusory to believe the public does not pay for
tort recoveries, or that resources for such are limitless. As it is with everything, a
balance must be struck-certain limits drawn. We are, in the end, dealing with
money, and that money must come from somewhere-from someone: the public pays
for the very most part by increased insurance premiums, taxation, prices paid for
consumer goods, medical services, and in loss of jobs when the manufacturing indus-
try is too adversely affected. A sound and viable tort system-generally what we now
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Justice Hutchinson concurred in the result but objected to the
court's interjection of foreseeability in the proximate cause analy-
sis."3 9 He stated that "the concept of foreseeability determines the
scope of duty not causation."140 As he explains, "duty. . .limits the
persons to whom an actor is responsible for damage caused by
careless conduct. . . .[clausation. . .limits the type of damages for
which an actor is responsible."' This case, he contended, involved
the actor's liability for a parent's grief resulting from the injury to
a child and therefore called into question legal cause not duty. 4"
Expounding further, Justice Hutchinson recited that Pennsylva-
nia had replaced the traditional concept of proximate cause with
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 legal cause. 4 3 Under this
theory, observed Justice Hutchinson, the test looks to the ramifica-
tions of the actor's conduct rather than to its foreseeability.1" He
concluded that foreseeability had no application in the determina-
tion of causation, but rather, under the Restatement (Second)
Torts §430, what must be determined is whether the actor's con-
duct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm.'45 Without explanation, Justice Hutchinson summarily con-
have-is a valuable incident of our free society, but we must protect it from excess
lest it become unworkable and alas, we find it replaced with something far more
desirable.
Id.
139. Id. Justice Hutchinson set forth the elements of a negligence action, i.e., the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, a breach of that
duty, actual damages and a causal nexus between the damages and the breach of the duty
owed. Id., citing Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680 (1983).
140. Id., citing Cantwell v. Allegheny County, 506 Pa. 35, 483 A.2d 1350 (1984); and
Zilka v. Sanctis Construction, Inc., 409 Pa. 396, 186 A.2d 897 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
850, 83 S. Ct. 1915, 10 L. Ed.2d 1070 (1963). The Justice stated: "[W]e unequivocally stated
the inapplicability of foreseeability to causation" in Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 428-
29, 84 A.2d 289, 292 (1951). The Dalhistrom court stated: "We are in accord with the doc-
trine that foreseeability has no place when we are considering proximate or legal cause.
Foreseeability, however, is an element, as above indicated, when the question of negligence
is being considered. . . Itihe question of foreseeability in connection with proximate cause
has no application." Id. at 428-29, 84 A.2d at 292.
141. 516 A.2d at 680.
142. Id.
143. Id., citing Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hospital, Inc., 502 Pa. 241, 465 A.2d 1231
(1983); Ford v. Jeffreis, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977); and Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa.
448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970).
144. 516 A.2d at 681.
145. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sections describing the test courts use for
causation provide
§ 430. Necessity of Adequate Causal Relation
In order that a negligent actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not
only that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that the negli-
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cluded that under the Restatement, no causal connection exists
where the plaintiff did not contemporaneously observe the acci-
dent giving rise to the injury.14
gence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's harm.
§ 431. What Constitutes Legal Cause
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his, negligence has resulted in the harm.
Justice Hutchinson further explained that "'[Slection 435(1) eliminates any remaining doubt
by specifically excluding foreseeability from causation analysis." Id. This section provides:
§ 435. Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of its Occurrence
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another,
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
Although Justice Hutchinson observed that subsection 2 of § 435 appears to interject fore-
seeability into the causation analysis in situations where it appeared highly unlikely that the
conduct would have caused the harm, comment (c) explained that in essence, this was really
a negligence factor rather than a causal factor. 516 A.2d at 681 n.1. Subsection (2) of § 435
provides: "The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears
to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm." Comment
(c) on subsection (2) states:
Where it appears to the court in retrospect that it is highly extraordinary that an
intervening cause has come into operation, the court may declare such a force to be a
superseding cause. (See § 442 (b).) Analytically, the highly extraordinary nature of
the result which has followed from the actor's conduct (with or without the aid of an
intervening force) indicates that the hazard which brought about or assisted in bring-
ing about that result was not among the hazards with respect to which the conduct
was negligent. (See §§ 451 and 468.) Strictly, the problem before the court is one of
determining whether the duty imposed on the actor was designed to protect the one
harmed from the risk of harm from the hazard in question. (See § 281, Comment 3,
and § 449.) However, courts frequently treat such problems as problems of causation.
(See § 281, Comment 3, and § 430, Comment a.)
146. Id. Although Justice Hutchinson did not specifically declare that in non-contem-
poraneous observation cases legal cause cannot be shown as a matter of law such a conclu-
sion may be drawn from the facts of this case. Specifically, Justice Hutchinson wrote: "In
this case, I would hold that no causal connection satisfying the standard of legal cause de-
scribed in § 431, . . .has been shown." Id. Thus, at first blush it appeared that Justice
Hutchinson had left unclear whether, in his opinion, this particular plaintiff had failed to
satisfy the element of causation as a matter of fact or whether in situations where the par-
ent-plaintiff did not contemporaneously observe the infliction of injury upon a child, but
came upon the scene shortly thereafter was, as a matter of law, unable to satisfy the stan-
dard for causation and thus, the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
could be dismissed summarily.
This case involved an appeal from the grant of a summary judgment in the nature of a
demurrer. As noted by the court, a motion for summary judgment may only be sustained if
the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, coupled with
affidavits, if any, demonstrated that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 675. The court
further recited that it was axiomatic that a demurrer could only be sustained where the
complaint, on its face, failed to establish a legal right to relief. Id. The court noted that a
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Justice Larsen, expressing his disturbance with the majority's
concern with t'he insurance crisis, dissented.1' 7 He emphatically ex-
claimed that for the court to take judicial notice of the plight of
the insurance industry 4 8 was manifestly inappropriate. 4" He con-
cluded that "[t]he debate over who or what to blame for the insur-
ance crisis in America should be carried on in the marketplace of
ideas and public opinion and in the halls of the legislature, not
rashly injected as make-weight rationalization in a judicial opinion
offered to justify the denial of redress in the courts to a deserving
plaintiff for her injuries."' 50
Justice Papadakos, writing in dissent, found no distinction be-
tween the situations where a parent suffered emotional distress
when he or she contemporaneously observed the injury to a child
and those instances where the parent did not witness the accident
but arrived moments after and observed the injured child.' 5' Citing
motion for summary judgment in the nature of a demurrer admitted as true all well-
pleaded, material, relevant facts. Id. Thus, if the facts as pled stated a claim for which relief
could be granted under any theory of law, the demurrer had to be denied. Id. In this case,
the plaintiff averred that as a result of observing her injured child at the scene of the acci-
dent she suffered emotional distress. Id. at 674. Thus, accepting these facts as true, sum-
mary judgment should have been denied.
The element of causation is normally a question of fact for the jury. However, the ques-
tion is to be removed from the jury's consideration when it is clear that reasonable minds
could not differ on the issue. Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.
Super. 8, 16, 481 A.2d 1194, 1198 (1984), citing Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc.,
407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434(1)(a); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS, § 45 (4th ed. 1971); and F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, Vol 2 §
20.2 (1956). One would be hard pressed to find that a parent who witnessed a severly injured
child could not suffer emotional distress. Thus, under Justice Hutchinson's proximate cause
analysis, this was a jury question and should have been left for the trier of fact.
147. 516 A.2d at 681. Justice Papadakos joined Justice Larsen's dissent. Id. at 680.
Justice Larsen reaffirmed the opinion expressed by Justice Flaherty in Yandrich v. Radic,
495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981), in which Justice Larsen had joined. Id. at 681.
148. Id. The dissent noted that the majority's concern with the insurance crisis was
"cloaked in the guise of concern for the 'consumer public.'" Id.
149. Id. at 682. Justice Larsen then discussed the differing views regarding the cause
and resolution of the insurance crisis. Id. at 682-83.
150. Id. at 683. Justice Larsen wrote:
It is inappropriate for this Court to gratuitously enter this debate, particularly where
no case or controversy or evidence concerning the "insurance crisis" has been
presented to us in an adversarial setting designed to test the statistics and theories of
both sides of the issue. It is unseemly for this Court to arbitrarily choose sides in the
debate and, by dictum, align itself with the insurance industry and attempt to judi-
cially "solve" the enormously complex insurance crisis by denying Ms. Mazzagatti the
right to seek recovery for her injuries, distress and deep trauma wrought at the hand
of a careless driver.
Id.
151. Id. Justice Papadakos was joined by Justice Larsen.
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the maxim that "one may seek redress for every substantial
wrong," Justice Papadakos found that a substantial wrong existed
in both situations.'52 Thus, he concluded, a motion for summary
judgment was inappropriate because it was a jury question whether
the emotional distress actually existed and whether it was caused
by the defendant's negligence.15 1
Claims For Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress In Other
Jurisdictions
As early as the fourteenth century, in the English case of I. de S.
et ux. v. W. de S.,154 courts have permitted recovery for a wrongful
invasion of one's right to emotional tranquility.1 55 Traditionally,
damages from emotional distress were parasitic to an underlying
tort action. 56 The two theories which were rooted in such jurispru-
dence were the impact rule and the zone of danger test. The first
of these two theories, the impact rule, required the plaintiff to es-
tablish the existence of the tort of battery before damages for emo-
tional distress could be sought. 57 Similarly, the zone of danger test
152. Id. at 683-84. Quoting Justice Flaherty's dissent in Yandrich, Justice Papadakos
stated:
There should be no hesitation to permit recovery for the emotional distress exper-
ienced by a parent who, although he did not witness the accident, nevertheless, ex-
perienced emotional trauma because of his son's injury. There is substantial injury in
both cases. Who can say that the emotional strain experienced by the parent witness-
ing the death of his child is greater than the emotional strain experienced by a parent
sitting helplessly in a hospital while his child dies? Certainly, the experiences of the
parents are different, but each has an inescapable common element: the child is dead.
Yandrich at 253-54, 433 A.2d at 464. He further wrote that "[while] the author of these
views had since abandoned them, I am proud to adopt them as my own to pick up the torch
in the agon which would insure that the injured can find redress in our courts for the harms
done them." 516 A.2d at 684.
153. Id. On the issue of solatium, Justice Papadakos agreed with the majority that
grief alone was not compensable by money damages; however he noted that "the existence
of actual physical or mental harm must be left to finding of the jury based upon evidence
presented to it." Id.
154. (1348) Y.B. Lib. Assis., 22 Edw. III, folio 99, platicum 60.
155. Noting that emotional tranquility is a valid interest which deserves legal protec-
tion, one commentator writes:
In our increasingly complex society, the orderly and normal functioning of a man's
mind is as critical to his well-being as physical health. Indeed, a sound mind within a
disabled body can accomplish much, while a disabled mind in the soundest of bodies
is rarely capable of making any substantial contribution to society.
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1237, 1237 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
156. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 at 154-56 (1933).
157. Those jurisdictions which still adhere to the impact rule include: District of Co-
lumbia, see Asuncion v. Columbia Hosp. for Women, 514 A.2d 1187 (1986); Georgia, see
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required the existence of the tort of assault before such damages
could be considered.
1 58
It was not until the seminal case of Dillon v. Legg that an Amer-
ican jurisdiction abandoned the traditional concepts of assault and
battery and applied traditional principles of negligence in order to
recognize a claim for emotional distress of a bystander. In Dillon,
the California Supreme Court permitted a parent who witnessed
the death of her child caused by defendant's negligence to recover
for her emotional trauma and physical injury although the parent
herself did not fear imminent physical harm. 159 The touchstone of
that court's analysis was duty and foreseeability. The court ex-
plained "[s]ince the chief element in determining whether the de-
fendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeabil-
ity of the risk, that factor will be of prime importance in every
case."' 60 In determining whether the defendant should have rea-
sonably foreseen the injury to the plaintiff, or in other terminology,
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the
court set forth three foreseeability factors."'1
Each of these factors has attracted much debate, but none has
been more controversial than the contemporaneous observation
factor. The following discussion focuses on this factor.
While the zone of danger test was once the widely favored rule, a
substantial and rapidly growing number of jurisdictions have re-
jected it as a vehicle to preclude recovery in bystander cases."6 2
Strickland v. R.F. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1986); Idaho, see Hatfield v.
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980) and see also Gill v.
Brown, 695 P.2d 1275 (1985); Indiana, Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Walters, 466 N.E.2d
55 (1984); Kentucky, Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W. 2d 141 (1980); Louisiana, Blackwell v.
Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293 (1983); and Oregon, Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or. App. 341, 717 P.2d
165 (1986).
158. Those jurisdictions which follow the "zone of danger" theory are: Arizona, see
Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Colorado, see James v. Harris, 729 P.2d
986 (1986); Delaware, see Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965);
Illinois, see Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E. 2d 1 (1983) and
Alexander v. DePaepe, 499 N.E. 2d 1065 (1986); Minnesota, Standler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d
552 (1980) and Laeon v. Washington County, 397 N.W. 2d 867 (1986); New York, Borsun v.
Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843 (1984); North Dakota, Whetham v. Bismark Hosp.,
197 N.W.2d 678 (1972); Tennessee, Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861
(1978) (note that this court limited its holding and expressed in dictum that it may adopt
Dillon factors when the appropriate case was presented); Id. Vermont, Guilmette v. Alexan-
der, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969), Id. Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont,
139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).
159. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
160. Id. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
161. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 190-219 and accompanying text.
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Those states have adopted some form of a foreseeability approach.
While some states, like Pennsylvania, have subscribed to Dillon's
foreseeability factor's and have rigidly interpreted and applied
them, 3 other subscribing jurisdictions have been more generous in
their interpretation of the parameters of the Dillon factors.'64
More specifically, while some states require contemporaneous ob-
servation of the event causing injury, other states do not require
observation of the incident at the precise moment of its
occurrence. 1
65
In analyzing the jurisdictions which have confronted the issue of
whether recovery may be allowed where the plaintiff did not wit-
ness the accident, the California decisions since Dillon will first be
reviewed. Only months after the Dillon decision, a California court,
in the case of Archibald v. Braverman,16 6 was faced with the task
of defining the parameters of the contemporaneous observation
factor. In Archibald, the court held that a mother who came upon
her injured child only moments after he had been injured by an
explosion satisfied the contemporaneous observation factor of Dil-
lon."'67 The court held that "the shock sustained by the plaintiff
must be fairly contemporaneous with the accident rather than fol-
low when the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later
date."' 68 Further, the court reasoned, "the shock of seeing a child
severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be just
as profound as that experienced in witnessing the accident
itself."'6
The Archibald decision was subsequently supported by the Cali-
fornia case of Nazaroff v. Superior Court.70 In Nazaroff, the
plaintiff, while searching for her son, walked by a neighbor's house
and heard the scream, "It's Danny!''7 She ran some 30 feet to the
pool and while running saw Danny being pulled form the pool. 72
She pushed aside a person giving Danny mouth-to-mouth resusita-
tion and took over efforts to save him. 73 Reversing summary judg-
163. See infra notes 220-228 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 162.
165. See supra note 163.
166. 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
167. Id. at 725.
168. Id., citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964).
169. Id.
170. 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
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ment for the defendant, the Nazaroff court concluded that failure
to see or hear the accident resulting in injury or death to a close
relative did not bar a claim of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The court held that the record "demonstrates that there are
triable issues to carry to the jury as to whether the alleged physical
harm to the mother resulted from an emotional shock proximately
caused by the direct emotional impact from the contemporaneous
observation of the immediate consequences of the defendant's neg-
ligent act, which was the proximate cause of the injury and death
of her son.'
'1 74
The parameters of the contemporaneous observation factor were
subsequently broadened in Nevels v. Yeager.'75 The Nevels case
involved a truck driver who ran a stop sign and struck a car in
which the plaintiff's children were riding. 71 Plaintiff, who was at
home, was phoned by a third party and arrived on the scene within
five minutes, whereupon she observed her child lying in a street
full of blood and screaming while being attended to by
paramedics. 77 Reversing the lower court's grant of defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the California Superior Court refused
to find, as a matter of law, that the arrival of a loved one on the
scene of an accident would not be foreseeable and who in such a
situation may well suffer shock contemporaneous with the
accident.1
7 8
However, subsequent California decisions have retreated from
these earlier decisions. For example, in Ebarb v. Woodridge Park
174. Id. at 664. The court reasoned:
The shout from the pool area may have permitted her to reconstruct the scene, as
well as did Mrs. Archibald and Mr. Krouse. Her knowledge of what had occurred was
derived from her own senses, and not from another's recital of an uncontemporaneous
event. Drowning, or near drowning, though initiated by an immersion, is not an in-
stantaneous occurrence. We cannot say as a matter of law that the injuries resulting
from defendants' negligence were not still being experienced at the time the mother
first observed her son. The evidence is conflicting as to the time of and the circum-
stances existing at her arrival. She must, of course, establish that she suffered physi-
cal injury, and that the physical injury resulted from an emotional shock suffered at
the original discovery of her son's plight, contemporaneously with the receipt of his
injury, and not from the subsequent realization of the irreversible progress of that
injury and her ensuing grief and sorrow on his death.
145 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (emphasis added).
175. 199 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1984).
176. Id. at 301.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 305. Appeal of this case to the California Supreme Court is pending. (L.A.
31901, hg. granted Apr. 26, 1984).
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Association,'1 9 a boy drowned in a pool when his arm became
jammed in a drain.' 80 His sister saw a firetruck driving towards the
site and realized something was wrong.'82 She was then told that
her brother had died.'83 Shortly thereafter she saw his body float-
ing in the pool.' 84 In affirming the lower court's grant of defend-
ant's summary judgment motion, the court declined to expand Dil-
lon's bystander factor to include a family member who witnessed
the result or the effects of an accident and not the accident
itself.'
8 5
The confusion among the California judiciary has not yet been
clarified. Demonstrative of the jurisdiction's continued confusion is
the most recent case of Thing v. LaChusa, s5 which appears to be
in direct conflict with Ebarb. Thing involved a parent who was in
her kitchen when her daughter rushed into the kitchen and yelled,
"They hit Johnny."' 8 6 The parent ran from her home and pushed
through the crowd that had formed and saw her injured son lying
in the street.87 Reversing the trial court's grant of defendant's
summary judgment motion, the court held that there existed tria-
ble issues of fact for the jury whether the parent's physical harm
resulted from emotional distress proximately caused from her con-
temporaneous witnessing of the immediate consequences of the de-
fendant's negligence."88
Other jurisdictions have also addressed the scope of the contem-
poraneous observation factor in situations where the plaintiff did
not actually witness the happening. 89 The most frequently cited
case permitting recovery in such circumstance is the Massachusetts
decision of Dziokonski v. Babineau.90 In Dziokonski, a parent,
who lived in the immediate vicinity of an accident involving her
daughter, went to the accident scene and witnessed her injured
179. 210 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1985).




184. Id. at 755.
185. 231 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1986).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 445.
189. These jurisdictions consist of Alaska, California, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and
Wyoming.
190. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
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daughter lying on the ground."' As a result, the mother suffered
emotional shock which led to her death. 2 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that "the determination whether there should
be liability for the injury sustained depends on a number of fac-
tors, such as where, when, and how the injury to the third person
entered into the consciousness of the claimant." ' The court con-
cluded that a parent stated a claim "where the parent either wit-
nesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the child is
still there." 94
Other jurisdictions as well as commentators9 5 have proffered, al-
191. 380 N.E.2d at 1296. This action was brought by the administratrix of the
mother's estate alleging that the death of the parent was the result of physical injuries
caused by the emotional distress which were caused by the injuries to the child by the de-
fendants' negligence. Id. at 1295. The superior court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, from which the administratrix appealed. Id.
192. Id. at 1296. The mother died while riding in the ambulance that was transporting
her daughter to the hospital. Id.
193. Id. at 1302. Additionally, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that there
must exist "substantial physical injury and proof that the injury was caused by the defend-
ant's negligence." Id. The requirement that the emotional distress physically manifest itself
has also been a subject of debate among the jurisdictions. See infra note 233 and accompa-
nying text.
194. Id. See also Ferriter v. Daniel. O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980). The Ferriter court held that "[a] plaintiff who rushes onto the accident scene and
finds a loved one injured has no greater entitlement to compensation for that shock than a
plaintiff who rushes instead to the hospital." Id. at 697. Further, the court noted that so
long as the shock followed "closely on the heels of the accident," the two types of injury
were equally foreseeable. Id. Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiffs' claims fell within the
principles of proximity set out in Dziokonski and therefore the motion for summary judg-
ment should have been denied. Id.
195. For example, Prosser states in PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.) § 54:.
It seems sufficiently obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her
child may be both a real and a serious injury. All ordinary human feelings are in favor
of her action against the negligent defendant. If a duty to her requires that she her-
self be in some recognizable danger, then it has properly been said that when a child
is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in
the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock. There is surely no great triumph of logic in
a rule which permits recovery for anxiety about an unborn child, and denies it once
the child is born, or compensates for distress at the discovery of ransacked furniture
but not the body of a murdered sister. Yet it is equally obvious that if recovery is to
be permitted, there must be some limitation. It would be an entirely unreasonable
burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered one man were to
be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by
reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every distant rela-
tive of the person injured, as well as his friends. And obviously the danger of fictitious
claims, and the necessity of some guarantee of genuineness, are even greater here
than before. It is no doubt such considerations that have made the law extremely
cautious.
Some limitations might, however, be suggested. It is clear that the injury threatened
or inflicted upon the third person must be a serious one, of a nature to cause severe
1024
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though in varying degrees, that the plaintiff need not actually wit-
ness the accident in order to recover for emotional damages. The
jurisdictions which have been confronted with such a case and
have so held include Alaska,196 New Jersey,'97 Texas' 9 and
Wyoming."'
In the Alaska case of Tommy's Elbow Room Inc. v. Kavorkian, °°
a daughter accompanied her father to a function.2 0 ' Thereafter, the
daughter left the function and the father stayed behind.2 2 On his
way home the parent-plaintiff noticed that there had been an acci-
dent.2 3 When he arrived home and discovered that his daughter
was not yet there he drove back to the accident scene to discover
police and medical technicians attempting to remove her from the
smashed automobile.20 ' Holding that the plaintiff was entitled to
present jury instructions for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it could not be
said "as a matter of law that it was not reasonably foreseeable that
a [plaintiff], would appear at the scene of the accident. '2 5
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court was faced with a situa-
tion where the parent-plaintiff lacked contemporaneous sensory
observation of the accident. In Mercado v. Transport of New
Jersey,0 6 the court held that the element of contemporaneous ob-
mental disturbance to the plaintiff, and that the shock must result in actual physical
harm. The action might, at least initially, well be confined to members of the immedi-
ate family on the one endangered, or perhaps to husband, wife, parent, or child, to
the exclusion of mere bystanders, and remote relatives. As an additional safeguard, it
might be required that the plaintiff be present at the time of the accident or peril, or
at least that the shock be fairly contemporaneous with it, rather than follow when
the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later date.
Id. at 334-35 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
196. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (1986).
197. Mercado v. Transport of New Jersey, 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (1980).
198. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W. 2d 486 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642
S.W. 2d 837 (1982); and City of Austin v. Davis, 693 S.W. 2d 31 (1985).
199. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (1986).
200. 727 P.2d 1038 (1986).




205. Id. at 1043.
206. 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (1980). In Mercado, the court was called upon
to determine the applicability of the Portee doctrine to a parent who had not observed the
injury to her child but came upon the scene shortly thereafter. The Portee doctrine
originated in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980), where the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that a mother who watched her seven year old son suffer and die when he
became trapped in an elevator could recover damages for mental distress, even though she
was not subjected to any risk of physical harm. Id. at 98-99, 417 A.2d at 526-27. The court
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servation was satisfied when a parent learned of an accident in
which her infant son was struck by a bus, minutes after when her
daughter rushed into her home to inform her, she thereafter hur-
ried outside and saw her son in the street severely injured and un-
conscious. 0 7 The court clarified that the requirement of contempo-
raneous observation "relates not to witnessing the moment of
actual impact, but to witnessing the suffering victim."208
Under Texas law the requirement of a contemporaneous obser-
vation of the accident giving rise to the emotional distress has also
been liberally construed. In Landreth v. Reed2 °9 it was held that
the actual observation of the accident was unnecessary if there was
some experiential perception of the accident other than learning of
it from others after its occurrence.2 10 Likewise, in City of Austin v.
Davis,211 a father who was intensely involved in a search for his son
and who subsequently found him at the bottom of an airshaft was
permitted recovery. 212 The court noted that the plaintiff "was
brought so close to the reality of the accident as to render [his]
experience an integral part of it," 213 and therefore, the plaintiff ex-
set forth four elements which need to be proved for recovery:
(1) the death or serious injury of another caused by defendant's negligence;
(2) a marital or intimate familial relationship between plaintiff and the injured person;
(3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and
(4) resulting severe emotional distress.
Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528.
207. 176 N.J. Super. at 236-37, 422 A.2d at 801. But see Bischoff v. Kohlrenken, 185
N.J. Super. 548, 449 A.2d 1347 (1982). In Bischoff, the court held that a parent may not
recover for emotional distress under the principles enunciated in Portee, where she neither
witnessed the automobile accident nor came upon the scene but rather visited here severely
injured son at the hospital shortly after the accident and before his death. Id. at 553, 449
A.2d at 1350.
208. 176 N.J. Super. at 238, 422 A.2d at 802. See Acevedo v. Essex County, 207 N.J.
Super. 579, 504 A.2d 813 (1985).
209. 570 S.W. 2d 486 (1978). In Landreth, the plaintiff sought recovery for emotional
distress suffered when she witnessed efforts to resuscitate her drowned sister. Id. at 488.
210. Id. at 470. According to the Landreth court, such a perception on the part of the
plaintiff existed. Id. That court further explained:
In seeing [the victim] brought from the pool in an emergency situation fraught with
life or death drama, together with the traumatic shock of witnessing the desperate
but unsuccessful attempts to save [the victim's] life, [plaintiff] was brought so close
to the reality of the accident as to render her experience an integral part of it. Such
an experience is far different from the case where one seeks damages for his grief or
agony at merely seeing the dead body of a loved one, or upon learning of the death
from others after its occurrence.
Id.(emphasis added).
211. 693 S.W.2d 31 (1985).
212. Id.at 32-33.
213. Id. at 34, quoting Landreth, supra.
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perienced sufficient perception of the accident to satisfy the con-
temporaneous observation requirement.2 '
The most recent jurisdiction to join these courts is Wyoming. In
Gates v. Richardson,"5 a child who was riding his bicycle was
struck by an automobile and seriously injured.216 The mother and
the daughter of the victim both brought an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress suffered when they arrived at the
accident scene only moments after it occurred and found the child
in the street, severely injured and bleeding.2 7 Adopting the ration-
ale of the Massachusetts case of Dziokonski, the Wyoming Su-
preme Court noted that "[t]he essence of the tort is the shock
caused by the perception of an especially horrendous event."218
The court explained:
It is more than the shock one suffers when he learns of the death or injury
of a child, sibling or parent over the phone, from a witness, or at the hospi-
tal. It is more than bad news. The kind of shock the tort requires is the
result of the immediate aftermath of an accident. It may be the crushed
body, the bleeding, the cries of pain, and, in some cases, the dying words
which are really a continuation of the event. The immediate aftermath may
be more shocking than the actual impact. Therefore, we hold that the plain-
tiff can recover if he observed the infliction of serious bodily harm or death
shortly after its occurrence but without material change in the condition
and location of the victim." 9
Some jurisdictions which have adopted the Dillon foreseeability
factors, specifically the contemporaneous observation factor, have
rigidly construed it to require that the plaintiff actually witness
the accident at the precise moment it occurred. Along with Penn-
sylvania, these jurisdictions include Iowa,22 0 Kansas, 2 1 New Mex-
ico 222 and Rhode Island. 223
214. Id. See also Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254 (1984) and Apache Ready Mix
Co., Inc. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79 (1983). These cases involved emotional distress claims by
plaintiffs who were unconscious at the precise moment of the incident and thus did not
observe the incidents. Both courts permitted recovery finding actual observation unneces-
sary due to the high degree of involvement the plaintiffs had with the incident giving rise to
the injuries.
215. 719 P.2d 193 (1986).
216. Id. at 194.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 199, citing Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981).
219. 719 P.2d at 199 (emphasis supplied). Citing Comment, Dillon Revisited, 43 OHIO
STATE L. REV. 931, 948 (1982).
220. Obereuter v. Orion Industries, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 492 (1984).
221. Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 (1982).
222. Ramiriz v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
223. Caparco v. Lambert, 402 A.2d 1180 (1979).
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For example, in Ramirez v. Armstrong,22 the New Mexico Su-
preme Court held that a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress existed for the children who witnessed an auto-
mobile strike and kill their father but not for the other child who
was not present at the scene of the accident but viewed him after
the accident.223 Similarly, in Oberreuter v. Orion Industries,
Inc.,226 the Iowa Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's
grant of defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, held that "recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress is intended to compensate
plaintiff. . . for the emotional trauma caused by plaintiff's visceral
participation in the event. It is the added horror of witnessing (and
possibly endlessly reliving) the tragedy that is compensable.
2 7
The court therefore concluded that the element of contemporane-
ous perception was "required to insure that plaintiff will have been
subjected to the added shock required to sustain the cause of the
action.""'
While a number of jurisdictions have had an opportunity to ad-
dress a non-witness case, there are a significant number of jurisdic-
tions that have not confronted such a case but have nonetheless
espoused a test which may allow a non-witness to recover for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.229 Some of these jurisdictions
have evaluated the Dillon factors as indicative of the degree of the
defendant's liability. 23 0 Other jurisdictions have more clearly
224. 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
225. Id. at 824.
226. 342 N.W.2d 492 (1984).
227. Id. at 494.
228. Id. In Versland v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583 (1983), and Kinard v. Augusta
Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985), Montana and North Carolina appear to have ap-
plied the Dillon foreseeability factors so as to deny recovery to a plaintiff who did not con-
temporaneously observe the accident.
229. These jurisdictions include Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Missouri, Michi-
gan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio and Washington.
230. These jurisdictions apparently adhere to the following Dillon rationale:
Obviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident
affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so.
Similarly, the degree of foreseeability of the third person's injury is far greater in the
case of his contemporaneous observance of the accident than that in which he subse-
quently learns of it. The defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the nearby,
witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant
from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction. All these
elements, of course, shade into each other; the fixing of obligation, intimately tied
into the facts, depends upon each case.
68 Cal.2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
See, e.g., State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (1985) (adopted the Dillon factors to assist in
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tipped their hand. For example, in Champion v. Gray,23 1 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was directly involved in
the event causing the original injury. "If such a person sees it,
hears it, or arrives upon the scene while the injured party is still
there, that person is likely involved.
23 2
Physical Manifestation of the Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Distress
The great majority of jurisdictions which recognize a remedy for
emotional distress require that the psychic trauma be manifested
physically."' However, these jurisdictions do not agree on what
calculating the degree of foreseeability of the emotional harm to a plaintiff bystander result-
ing from defendant's conduct); James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (adopted
the view expressed by the Massachusetts case of Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,
381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 which declared that plaintiff was entitled to compensation
for negligent infliction of emotional distress as long as the shock followed closely on the
heels of the accident); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (1982) (impo-
sition of liability is ultimately a factual determination which must be made on a case by
case basis; the Dillon test should not be applied formalistically to bar arguably valid
claims); and Pugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d (1983). The Dillon factors were
not intended to be fixed guidelines which an aggrieved bystander was required to satisfy in
order to recover; rather, the factors were to be taken into account by courts in assessing the
degree of foreseeability of emotional injury to the plaintiff.
See also D'Amicol v. Alvarex Shipping Co., Inc., 31 Conn. Sup. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973);
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W. 765
(1983); and Gustafson v. Faris, 67 Mich. App. 363, 241 A.2d 208 (1976). Gustafson adopted
the view expressed by Prosser quoted in note 182 supra. See Williams v. Citizen Mut. Ins.
Co. of America, 94 Mich. App. 762, 290 N.W.2d 76 (1980); Corso v. Merril, 119 N.H. 647, 406
A.2d 300 (1978); and Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). See also
Nolan, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33
HASTING L.J. 583, 588-89 (1982).
231. 478 So.2d 17 (1985). See Eagle-Pincher Industries,Inc., 481 So.2d 517 (1985). In
Champion, the Florida Supreme Court abandoned the impact rule.
232. 478 So.2d at 20. Under Pennsylvania law, as well as other jurisdictions, the
Champion case would be distinguishable from non-witness cases because the facts in Cham-
pion indicate that the plaintiff heard the impact and then went to the accident scene. Id. at
18.
The Champion court also required that there existed "significant discernible physical in-
jury, . . . caused by psychological trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a
close family member within the sensory perception of the physically injured person, is too
great a harm to require direct physical contact before a cause of action exists." Id. at 18-19
(footnote omitted). The court further emphasized the requirement that a "causally con-
nected clearly discernible physical impairment must accompany or occur within a short time
of the psychic injury." Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).'
In a case decided on the same day as Champion, the court vacated a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff because his emotional distress was not physically manifested. Brown v. Cadillac
Motor Car Div., General Motors Corp., 468 So.2d 903 (1985).
233. The reasoning that has supported the view that negligently caused emotional dis-
tress, without bodily harm, does not warrant recovery against a person who negligently
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constitutes "physically manifested." While some jurisdictions re-
quire that the emotional distress result in serious physical harm
others merely require that the emotional distress by physically
manifested in some degree.2 3
In the years following Sinn, there has been much confusion
among the Pennsylvania appellate courts on whether the mental
disturbance must be physically manifested in order to state a cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Sinn it-
self, Justice Nix noted that "[a]dvancements in modern science
lead us to further conclude that physic injury is capable of being
proven despite the absence of a physical manifestation of such in-
jury."'235 However, this was not the view of the court. Chief Justice
Eagen, who specifically concurred, proffered that severe physical
manifestation of the emotional distress was an essential component
of the cause of action.23 6 Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion
in Sinn, provided that:
[I]f there is no reasonable measure of plaintiff's pain, then any recovery will
be essentially speculative. Then, too, the nature of our society requires of
each of us a remarkable degree of emotional fortitude. It is not unreasona-
ble to draw the line between that degree which is required and that which is
not by reference to that emotional distress which causes serious physical
injury or harm. And it cannot be denied that if not the genuineness, then at
least the intensity and thus the nature of the injury, may be difficult to
assess where it causes no physical injury.237
Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital,a3 and Vattimo v. Lower
caused that distress has relied on three assumptions: (1) emotional distress which does not
manifest itself physically is normally trivial; (2) physical harm guarantees the genuiness of
the claim; and (3) the defendant's fault (i.e., its negligence) is not so great as to require
making good a purely mental disturbance.
This view is in keeping with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, comment b
(1965), which provides: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor
is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
The Restatement rule is followed by the majority of the American courts. See Prosser,
supra, at 330.
For an excellent analysis within this area, see Comment, Negligent Inflicted Mental Dis-
tress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1237 (1971).
234. See Note, The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating Claims
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 213, 221. See also Leong v.
Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 1903 (1986); and Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (1982).
235. See supra note 80.
236. 486 at 174, 404 A.2d at 686-87.
237. Id. at 177-78, 404 A.2d at 688.
238. 293 Pa. Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981).
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Bucks Hospital, Inc.23 9 were early forecasts of the conflict on this
issue between the Pennsylvania courts. Relying upon the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 436A, the Banyas court found that be-
cause the plaintiff's complaint did not aver physical harm, a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress could not lie.24 In con-
trast, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Vattimo declared
that if emotional harm to the plaintiff in fact resulted, fortuitous
avoidance of physical harm did not foreclose the question of the
tortfeasor's liability.
2 4'
Subsequent Pennsylvania appellate court decisions continued to
illustrate the confusion on this issue.2" 2 While the greater weight of
authority dictates that the mental harm suffered must physically
manifest itself,24 3 other Pennsylvania courts have held to the
contrary.2"
Proposal For A New Approach
Pennsylvania's rigid application of the Dillon factors is antithet-
ical to the concept of foreseeability. Since the landmark case of
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,243 foreseeability has been accepted as
a template for duty. In turn, foreseeability has been used by the
courts to limit duty for policy reasons. The underlying policy for
limiting duty in the context of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress is the concern of imposing unduly burdensome liability upon
the tortfeasor. However, "[a] policy which is relied on to narrow
the scope of the negligent tortfeasor's duty must be justified by
cogent and intelligible consideration, and must be capable of defin-
ing the appropriate limits of liability by reference to factors which
are not purely arbitrary. Pennsylvania's approach is founded in
neither logic nor policy.
In Mazzagatti, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court realized its ap-
plication of the Dillon factor of contemporaneous observation
lacked logical support. This is evidenced by Chief Justice Nix's at-
tempt to distinguish between denying recovery for negligent inflic-
239. 59 Pa. Cmwlth. 1, 428 A.2d 765 (1981). See also Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274
Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980).
240. 293 at 129, 437 A.2d at 1240.
241. 59 Pa. Cmwlth. at 8, 428 A.2d at 768.
242. See Commonwealth v. Balisteri, 329 Pa. Super. 148 n.7, 478 A.2d 5 n.7 (1984).
243. See Cathcart v. Keene, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 147 A.2d 483 (1984).
244. See Little v. York City Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa. Super. 8, 481 A.2d
1184 (1984).
245. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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tion of emotional distress where the plaintiff does not witness the
injury to a child but rather learns of the incident and subsequently
arrives at the scene and the situation where the plaintiff actually
witnesses the accident. The Chief Justice reasoned that in the for-
mer factual situation the plaintiff's "prior knowledge of the injury
to the victim serves as a buffer against the full impact of observing
the accident scene" since he has time to brace his emotional sys-
tem.246 However, this rationale is fatally weakened by the Brooks
case. In Brooks, the plaintiff alleged emotional distress when he
came upon the accident scene without prior knowledge of its occur-
rence and observed his injured son.24 Thus, under the rationale
expressed in Mazzagatti the plaintiff in Brooks lacked the prior
notice to enable him to brace his emotional system. Ignoring its
own reasoning, the Brooks court affirmed the grant of defendant's
motion to dismiss.
Often the search for legal certainty obstructs the law's pursuit of
justice. Pennsylvania's continued arbitrary application of the con-
cept of foreseeability in claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress would result in such an obstruction.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should abandon its efforts to
rationalize the propriety of the contemporaneous observation re-
quirement for stating a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. More specifically, the court should follow the lead of other
jurisdictions which do not require the plaintiff to plead contempo-
raneous observation of the event in order to state such a claim.
Along with the Dillon factors, the court should also utilize other
factors as guideposts for determining whether the plaintiff was a
foreseeable victim of the defendant's negligent conduct, or in other
parlance, whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plain-
tiff. In addition to the Dillon factors the court should consider the
setting in which the defendant acted negligently; that is, is the fo-
rum in which the defendant acted one in which it is likely that a
parent or relative would be present. For example, it is foreseeable
that if one drives negligently through a residential area someone is
likely to be seriously injured and it is also foreseeable that a parent
or relative may witness the incident or immediately come upon the
accident scene and consequently suffer serious emotional distress.
The court should also consider when and under what circum-
stances the plaintiff came into consciousness of the injured victim.
246. Mazzagatti, supra, at 680.
247. Brooks, supra, at 676.
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That is, was there prior knowledge of the accident; how much time
had elapsed between the time the plaintiff was notified and the
time the plaintiff observed the victim; did the plaintiff observe the
accident scene unchanged; and how severe were the injuries to the
victim. Different weight may be accorded to those factors which
are more likely to cause emotional distress if they exist, although
the non-existence of one such factor should not be dispositive of
the foreseeability inuiry. The application of these factors must be
made on a case-by-case basis.
The type of damages which should be recoverable for negligent
infliction of emotional distress are those which become manifested
in a serious physical condition and which can be shown to be caus-
ally linked to the defendant's negligent conduct. Also to be com-
pensable are those injuries which although they do not become
physically manifested, result in a serious psychological disorder. To
allow otherwise would be to totally ignore the advancements in the
modern medical field.
This author contends that an application of this approach to the
two present cases, while Brooks being more persuasive, should
have survived a motion to dismiss on the basis of foreseeability, for
both plaintiffs were reasonably foreseeable.""
These guidelines set forth above would provide the court with a
vehicle which would advance the relevant policy, in that it it would
not impose unduly burdensome liability, while concurrently being
rooted in logic.
Brian Fulginiti
248. However, the damages claimed in both respective cases are not the type which
whould solicit legal redress. Thus, while the motion to dismiss on the basis of foreseeability
should not have been granted, it is urged that such a grant would have been proper if based
on the injuries alleged.
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